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Abstract 
There is a general consensus that ‘context’ matters for development outcomes, yet we have little 
understanding of how exactly ‘context’ affects outcomes. This paper focuses on the question of 
‘context’ in social accountability initiatives by separating macro and micro contextual factors. 
On the macro side (country level), accountability processes need to take into account broad 
factors such as national histories of citizen-state engagement. On the micro side, local factors can 
drive the extent to which social accountability initiatives are successful, even within otherwise 
broadly similar national contexts. 
The paper outlines the basic components of accountability and proposes a ‘causal chain’ strategy 
to better understand the micro-context. This would allow existing evidence to be reorganized to 
assess the promise of existing and new initiatives by deconstructing the various mini-causal 
pathways (i.e. in the micro-context) and understanding the contextual conditions that make them 
work.   
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1. Introduction 
 
A common refrain in eliciting lessons from experiences with development initiatives is that the 
outcomes depend critically on ‘context’ (Booth 2011). This is also true of the range of recent 
social accountability (SA) initiatives that are increasingly popular among donors and civil 
society organisations (Ringold, Holla, Koziol and Srinivasan 2012; McGee and Gaventa 2011; 
Foresti, O’Neil and Hudson 2007)i. Despite this general consensus, there is limited progress on 
understanding exactly how ‘context’ affects outcomes; and the related question of exactly which 
contextual factors matter. Dictionary definitions of context help illustrate the problem: ‘the 
conditions and circumstances that are relevant to the event or fact’ (Free Dictionary); ‘the 
general situation within which something happens that helps to explain it’ (Macmillan); ‘the 
circumstances that form the setting for an event, statement, or idea, and in terms of which it can 
be fully understood’ (Oxford English Dictionary). The ambiguity in these definitions lies in the 
fact that which ‘circumstances’, ‘conditions’ and ‘general situation’ are relevant to the event is 
subjective. So how can we get a handle on which elements of context are relevant to 
understanding success and failure? 
 
In this paper, drawing on the large and growing reported experience with local social 
accountability processes, I suggest that there are two broad parts to the issue—the macro and the 
micro. On the macro side, there is now growing acknowledgement that accountability processes 
are better viewed as located within larger histories of citizen-state engagement and related 
political processes (Fox 2007; Joshi and Houtzager 2012). This recognition has led scholars to 
identify broad features of the context that seem to matter for outcomes. The macro approach, 
which has dominated the limited existing literature, largely focuses on particular socio-economic 
and political realities at the country level. What we have learned to date from this approach is 
elaborated briefly in Section 2 following this introduction.  
 
At the micro level, local factors can clearly drive the way certain SA initiatives unfold and the 
extent to which they are successful even within otherwise broadly similar contexts. For example, 
very similar initiatives intended to provide information to communities in order to support 
accountability demands and improve educational outcomes could have different impacts despite 
being in similar country contexts (Pandey, Goyal and Sundararaman. 2009). Yet, few have 
explored why this might be the case and how one might approach issues of context at the local 
level. The main contribution of this paper is an elaboration of the individual components of 
social accountability at the local level, and a ‘theory of change or causal chain’ strategy to gain 
traction on the thorny issue of micro-context. Such a strategy is elaborated in Section 3. The 
argument is that two broad aspects are important in understanding the micro context: a) the 
features of the individual components of accountability processes and b) the causal chains 
through which social accountability processes linking these broad components are expected to 
work. The disaggregation of components of information, citizen action and state response is 
carried out in section 4. A preliminary relatively linear causal chain is mapped in Section 5, 
which could be used as a potentially basic frame on which complex chains could be developed. 
The conclusions, presented in Section 6, map out the implications of this approach to context. 
 
2. The Macro Context: Broad Political Economy Features 
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Over the years, there have been several attempts to systematically understand the larger 
contextual factors that influence the outcomes of development initiatives under various 
frameworks such as the ‘drivers of change’ approach, or more recently political economy 
analysis (PEA) and power analysis (PA) (Petit and Mejia Acosta, this volume). The idea is to 
identify factors that are enabling or constraining with respect to change given the particularities 
socio-economic and political conditions in a country or context (Routley and Hulme 2013). 
Driven by the unpredictability of outcomes of similar developmental initiatives in different 
contexts, the drivers of change/political economy approach attempts to expose the underlying 
power relationships, incentives and interests among broad groups that might affect whether 
specific reforms will have traction. A recent definition of PEA crystallises the thinking behind 
these approaches:  
 
‘political economy analysis investigates how political and economic processes interact in 
a given society, and support or impede the ability to solve development problems that 
require collective action. It takes particular account of the interests and incentives driving 
the behaviour of different groups and individuals, the distribution of power and wealth 
between them, and how these relationships are created, sustained and transformed over 
time’ (Unsworth and Williams 2011).  
 
Practical tool kits have been developed by several organisations as a guide for undertaking 
political economy analysis (Fritz, Kaiser and Levy 2009; DFID 2009). These toolkits contain 
several guiding questions about contextual features in different aspects of analysis (e.g. the 
business-state relationship, state dependence on earned revenues etc). Some thinking has also 
gone into developing guides to political economy analysis in particular sectors (Moncrieffe and 
Lutrell 2005; EC/Europeaid 2008; Reich and Balarajan 2012). 
 
In the field of social accountability, such macro contextual analysis is relatively new. Although 
country level contextual analysis for social accountability not surprisingly, shares many features 
with general PEA, it also tends to focus on particular features, for example freedom of media, as 
they are directly related to social accountability initiatives. Further, studies have sought to 
identify factors that run across instances of success (Bukenya, Hickey and King 2012; Bukenya 
and King 2012; McGee and Gaventa 2011; Joshi 2013). Some of the common lessons include: 1) 
that information and transparency is necessary but not sufficient for accountability actions to be 
undertaken; 2) that accountability action without a corresponding capacity for state response can 
be counterproductive; 3) that effective sanctions play an important role in sustaining 
accountability demands; 4) that collective action is important for accountability to the poor and 
5) that existing cases of successful social accountability are underpinned by cross boundary 
alliances between social actors and state reformists that create accountability coalitions.  
 
O’Meally (2013) offers a recent, and relatively comprehensive review of the literature on 
contextual factors that matter for social accountability. Because this is one of the most recent 
attempts to provide a framework for analysing context, it is useful to go into it in some detail 
here. His take on contextual factors is explicitly political. The underlying meta theory of change 
that underpins successful social accountability and drives his contextual analysis is that: 
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‘if pro-accountability and pro-poor networks in society are adequately resourced 
and build coalitions with pro-accountability networks and actors in political society 
through rounds of state-society bargaining and interaction; and, 
if these coalitions are able to : a)negotiate changes with anti-change actors; b) 
generate sufficient counter-veiling power to change governing elite incentives and 
challenge the primary/secondary political settlement; and/or c) active contextually 
legitimate accountability mechanisms... 
...then, this might result in a) coercion - a backlash from existing power-holders; 
b) co-optation and collaboration - incremental improvements in accountability relations 
and developmental gains within the existing political settlement; and/or c) change - more 
fundamental change, to differing degrees, leading to the formation of a ‘new’ political 
settlement/social contract’. (O’Meally 2013:29-30). 
 
It is clear from this very broad theory of change, that the contextual conditions that matter range 
from the deep rooted structures in society, e.g. political settlements, to more tractable features, 
e.g. nature of civil society organisations. Capturing the range of factors that might be included in 
such analysis is vast - and O’Meally identifies six broad ‘contextual domains’: a) civil society, b) 
political society, c) inter-elite relations and the political settlement; d) state-society relations and 
the social contract e) intra society relations and issues of social inclusion; f) global factors (see 
Annex 1). These are then further broken down into various aspects that have a bearing on their 
enabling or constraining potential (see annex 1). 
 
The characteristics of these domains in particular contexts can point to the feasibility of social 
accountability as a specific strategy for improving services, empowering citizen and 
strengthening governance. The main messages from O’Meally’s (2013) review of context 
suggests that practitioners should think politically when considering social accountability, link 
social accountability strategies to prevailing institutions of political accountability, work to 
enhance state capacity to respond to generated demand, support pro-accountability coalitions that 
cut across the state-society divide, learn by doing and use longer time horizons, take account of 
global influences on accountability, build on existing processes and make issues of inclusion and 
exclusion more central to accountability processes. Some have undertaken further work to 
highlight the constraints and entry points for social accountability work in typified contexts e.g. 
relatively closed polities (Gandhi forthcoming) or fragile states (Boeckman 2012). While this 
work advances our thinking considerably on the features of context that seem to matter, these are 
still very broad messages and pose the challenge of how to operationalise them in particular local 
context. 
 
3. The Micro Context: Assumptions and Causal Chains 
While the contextual factors identified in the studies discussed above (particularly O’Meally 
2013) are useful in providing key questions that practitioners should be asking about various 
domains, in specific kinds of polities they do not help in suggesting which particular strategies 
are likely to work; rather they help identify whether SA as a general approach should be 
considered or not.  
 
Yet, developmental actors require signposts of a more detailed kind. Are community scorecards 
more appropriate or are social audits better in specific contexts? Should collective action focus 
  5
on pursuing rights claims through existing complaint mechanisms or should one organise street 
protests? Are information provision strategies likely to be successful, or is the creation of strong 
channels of grievance redress? What combinations of approaches work in specific settings? What 
potential bottlenecks are likely to emerge? What essential factors need to be in place before 
attempting particular strategies? While practitioners regularly take decisions on these kinds of 
questions, based on a range of factors, including their own capacity, past experience with 
approaches etc.; they could be better informed by a clearer understanding of the lessons from 
what initiatives have worked in the past, and in what contexts.  
 
And how are we to make judgements of this kind from the evidence (limited as it is) that exists? 
We know from the literature that even lessons from the most highly regarded evaluation studies - 
randomised controlled trials (RCTs) - of social accountability interventions have problems with 
generalisability of the results (external validity) (Woolcock 2009, Ravallion 2009).    
 
In fact, an insightful reflection highlights several issues with prevailing interpretations of the 
existing evidence to date, especially evidence of failure (Fox 2014). The most widely cited 
studies, rather than suggesting that social accountability does not work, actually point to some of 
the conditions that make it work. Foremost, in keeping with the larger literature, across the 
studies evidence shows that information alone is not enough to spark community action and 
subsequent provider response. One needs supporting processes for collective action. Similarly, 
neither is community monitoring from below enough to get service improvements; mainly 
because it lacks bite. Rather, combined with other accountability mechanisms, (e.g. top down 
accountability, or sanctions with teeth) it can have the desired effects. Finally, elite capture is a 
real problem in community focussed programmes, including social accountability ones. Fox 
concludes from the evidence that we need to rethink some of our basic propositions of 
accountability work to move from a focus on ‘tactical’ approaches to more ‘strategic’ ones. 
 
Given these challenges and the general problem of context posed by accountability work, in a 
recent paper Cartwright and Munro (2010), elaborate on the problem of external validity and 
outline two conditions that are important in extrapolating the causal inferences made in a 
particular study context to another: a) the study and the target population are the same with 
respect to the probability of their relevant compositions; and b) the study and target population 
are the same with respect to the causal laws for the outcomes. Yet, randomisation does not deal 
with the latter issue. In other words, the processes that make the mechanism work, may not be 
the same. To generalise we need to understand specific features of context. As they highlight 
 
‘Most causal and probabilistic relations relied on in health care and social practice are not 
fundamental: they do not just hold, they hold on account of some underlying structure 
that gives rise to them. When the structures are different, so too are the causal and 
probabilistic relations they create.’ (Cartwright and Munro 2010: 261)  
 
Thus, they point to the need for unpacking the initiatives in terms of a theory of change or causal 
chain, in order to understand how desired outcomes might work. 
 
Increasingly, this approach to social accountability initiatives is being seen as a promising one 
(World Bank 2013, Vogel 2012; Tembo 2012; Lieberman Posner and Tsai 2012; Holland and 
  6
Thirkell 2009). In ground-breaking new work that parallels the approach of this paper, the World 
Bank is elaborating on key elements of social accountability and the factors that drive them by 
re-examining the evidence we have from evaluation research, but also from behavioural 
economics, anthropology and political science which allows for testing links in implicit causal 
chains for their robustness (World Bank 2013, World Bank forthcoming). A theory of 
change/causal chain approach allows one to understand implicit assumptions underlying 
particular activities, the conditions that are enabling or constraining as well the extent to which 
initiatives travel through the assumed causal chain and reach intermediate objectives even if the 
final outcomes are not those expected. This approach can, in particular, identify bottlenecks in 
the causal chain that can be responsible for some observed adverse outcomes.   
 
In taking up the task of unpacking causal chains, we propose that two aspects are important to 
understand the potential of particular approaches in specific settings: the components of the 
pathway plus the mechanisms (and related micro-contextual factors) through which each of the 
components could lead to the other. An analogy from the physical world might be useful here. 
Suppose we want to push an object from location A to B. We can use different mechanisms to do 
this - we could place wheels under the object and roll it to B; we could push it to location B, we 
could lift the object and put in B. The mechanism in this example is the means we use to relocate 
the object. However each of these mechanisms will operate dependent upon the specificities of 
the component (object) itself - the object may be lifted because it is light, or because it may be 
dismantled and carried piece by piece. It is also important to note that the actual enabling 
conditions might look different in different cases due and some micro contextualii conditions we 
can use wheels if the path to B is relatively smooth. Often we assume these conditions are in 
place because they seem ubiquitous in the cases where the intervention works and we would not 
pay attention to them. However, they underpin why some initiatives work, and may not be 
present in specific instances we are concerned with, and thus lead to intervention failure. Overall, 
the role the enabling micro-context plays is the same - in terms of enabling the mechanism to 
work. For any specific component, we need to understand both how the mechanism works and 
micro-context/component in order to see whether particular strategies will help us reach the 
outcome we desire. 
 
One additional consideration is necessary before beginning to unpack SA. One can take two 
different approaches to what one means by an SA ‘intervention’. On the one hand one can 
differentiate by common SA interventions - e.g. community scorecards, social audits etc. - and 
elaborate an evaluation framework and a theory of change for each. This has been the prevailing 
approach in several studies (Foresti et al 2007, Barr, Mugisha, Serneels and Zeitlin forthcoming). 
On the other hand, one might start from a more general broad theory of change that underpins 
ideas about demand for good governance and citizen-led accountability. This might comprise a 
series of steps that combine in different ways in common SA initiatives - e.g., awareness raising, 
information demands, protests, etc. (Joshi and Houtzager 2012). Although less prevalent in the 
literature, we take this approach in the paper for reasons that will become evident in the next 
section. 
 
4. Unpacking the Accountability Black Box: Information, Citizen Action, and State 
Response 
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If one starts from the point of disaggregating social accountability into its component parts 
(rather than look at ‘labelled’ interventions such as social audits, community monitoring etc.) 
then as a first step, one will have to separate its broad components. While this might be done in 
different ways (see World Bank forthcoming), and will vary depending upon the nature of the 
citizen groups and the target of accountability actions among other things, we know that social 
accountability has something to do with three broad things: information, citizen action and state 
responses. 
 
The conventional assumptions have been that the provision of some kind of 
information/transparency will lead to citizen action, which will then lead to state response 
(Figure 3.1). This unidirectional causal chain often implicitly underpins social accountability 
initiatives. 
 
Figure 1: Assumed Link between Information, Citizen Action and State Response 
 
 
 
However, the relationship between these three components is not so straightforward—each of the 
arrows, from information, to citizen action to state response, could work in the other direction 
(Figure 2). For example, citizen action through mobilisation could lead to the generation or 
exposure of relevant information. State responses may encourage or restrain citizen action. State 
responses can also take the form of making previously opaque information public. And 
sometimes, the revelation of information can directly spur state responses without being 
mediated through citizen action. It seems clear that the linkages between these three components 
are not as straightforward as assumed in the unidirectional causal chain. 
 
Figure 2: Potential Dynamic Links between Information, Citizen Action and State 
Response 
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In addition to the complexity of the multiple pathways of interaction between these three 
components, the nature of the component itself matters. All information is not equal; all citizen 
action is not the same and all state responses cannot be seen as accountability enhancing. 
Although most scholars and practitioners, if questioned, would acknowledge the qualitative 
differences between different types of information, citizen action and state response, curiously 
the literature treats them all alike, especially when attempting to aggregate lessons on social 
accountability. This ambiguity calls for a closer conceptual look at the nature of each component 
of social accountability. 
 
A. Information 
There are several issues related to the nature of information in social accountability processes. 
First and foremost is the issue of usefulness: as Fox (2007) puts it, is the information opaque or 
clear? If the information is provided in a form that is not understandable or actionable then it is 
unlikely to trigger collective action (Fung, Graham and Weil 2007). Usually, whether 
information is opaque or transparent depends upon the source of the information, and the 
incentives people have for full and clear disclosure. 
 
Second, is the credibility of the information source - it is likely to be accurate and reliable? Does 
the information provider have incentives to distort or obfuscate information? If the information is 
produced through a process in which citizens have participated then it is more likely to be 
credible and legitimate. On the other hand, information provided by governments, will be 
considered more authoritative when considering state responses. When the information used in 
accountability demands is generated through a process involving both providers and users, then it 
is likely to have more legitimacy for all stakeholders. 
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Third, there is the issue of whether the information provided is about official standards, (of 
either/both processes and outputs) or whether the information is about performance in relation to 
other similarly placed comparators. On the one hand, when the information relates to established 
standards, then citizens are expected to mobilise and demand performance up to the official 
standards, which may be unrealistic. On the other hand, when information is about performance 
and is comparative (e.g. lead tables in the UK), citizens may be provoked by realising that 
similarly placed groups are receiving better services than them for no rational reason. Here the 
trigger for collective action is competition among localities (or groups) based on more realistic 
expectations. 
 
Fourth, information can have an inspirational effect.iii Stories of successful citizen action leading 
to greater state responsiveness and improved services elsewhere, can catalyse a ‘we can do it too’ 
spirit in communities that might otherwise not consider accountability demands. The lessons 
from success here are not so much the actual citizen action or pathways through which 
accountability gains were made, as much as the fact that it is possible to gain success in 
accountability claims at all, despite difficult environments. 
 
These four aspects of information (and there might be others) imply different causal paths for 
usage as a part of the accountability process. Each potential pathway has a set of assumptions 
that underlie it. For example, there is no reason to believe that clear information from a non-
credible source will trigger citizen demands for accountability. Or when information is about 
standards that are out of reach, there may be little faith in state responsiveness. Starting with 
categorising the nature of information on the four aspects can throw light about the possible 
paths that link information with both citizen action and state responses. 
 
B. Citizen Action 
Similar to the discussion on information, the content of citizen action can be broken down into 
several elements (Joshi and Houtzager 2012). First, citizens can demand information from 
governments related to budgets and spending, processes, standards and performance. Often 
budgets and expenditures can be skewed towards the better off, processes and entitlements are 
not well understood, and the actual performance of government remains opaque. This is the 
reason why information campaigns often accompany social accountability initiatives. 
 
Second, citizen action itself can generate relevant information - for example through perception 
surveys, expenditure tracking or budget analysis. Such information, as discussed above, is likely 
to be viewed more credibly by communities due to the legitimacy of its collation. 
Simultaneously, the process of demanding or gathering information however, might itself spark 
off greater mobilisation for accountability. 
 
Third, societal actors can keep a watch on services through on-going monitoring of the actual 
quality of public goods being delivered. Are teachers absent from classes? Are medical supplies 
in stock? Are officials demanding bribes for services? Are contractors using appropriate 
materials as per specifications? These issues are best scrutinised by those who are close to the 
services in question and are able to monitor performance on a regular basis. Such on-going 
monitoring forms part of accountability action, but need not require state response if nothing is 
found to be amiss. 
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Fourth, if monitoring and information gathering shows that there are gaps between expected and 
delivered levels of service, then further citizen action is required in terms of seeking 
accountability. Such action can involve making demands to enforce legal standards that are not 
currently being met, or explanations of why it is not feasible. For example, communities may 
demand more teachers in a school if the teacher pupil ratio is higher than established norms. This 
is an important element of social accountability: to give governments opportunities to remedy the 
situation when suitably informed or provide credible explanations of why the standards cannot 
be met. 
 
Finally, if dissatisfied with the explanations provided, or if corruption is exposed, social groups 
can seek grievance redress. This could be done either through existing administrative complaint 
mechanisms, political protests or litigation. If grievance redress channels do not exist, citizen 
action may take the form of demands for them to be established.   
 
Which of the above actions are actually undertaken depends upon various factors including 
whether communities are mobilized, past experience of interactions with the state, and cultures 
of expectations from the state. In addition, these various actions can be combined in different 
ways in sequence, or in parallel. Underpinning each of these actions, is a set of assumptions 
about how these might work.   
 
C. State Response 
Within the literature on social accountability, the least explored aspect is that of state response. 
While the key expectation is that public officials will respond to citizen action and make 
improvements, the actual substance of their response can vary considerably including generating 
and releasing information, to reforming processes, mobilising resources, advocating for reforms 
at higher levels and changing their own behaviour. They could also initiate investigations of 
wrongdoings and sanction those responsible. On the negative side, they could instigate reprisals 
and ignore reputational taints. What sorts of citizen action trigger particular responses, and in 
what contexts? While there is consensus that social accountability advocates should focus on 
state inclination and capacity to respond, there is little understanding of why officials might take 
certain actions rather than others (for an exception see Aiyar and Mehta 2014). Unpacking the 
assumptions we make in expecting state responses to citizen action will be key to understanding 
the micro-contextual factors that matter. 
 
For each of the components: of information, citizen action and state response, there are 
associated processes depending upon the form components take. Information can be generated 
through crowd sourcing, perception surveys, participatory research or monitoring and be made 
public through a variety of channels, including the media. State responses can be in the form of 
behaviour changes, public sector reform, retaliation against claimants, and sanctions against 
those responsible. Each of these processes that circumscribe particular elements has an 
associated set of assumptions that underpin them which are illustrated in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1: A Broad Categorisation of Components 
 
  11
Component Content Process Assumptions/Micro-context 
Information 
 
 
Performance 
- Compared to 
standards 
- Compared to 
others 
Inspirational 
 
Transparency 
Generating New Information 
(e.g. Perception data, 
monitoring data) 
Media campaigns 
 
Literacy/Access 
Legitimacy/ credibility of 
Information 
Citizen Action 
 
 
Demand Information 
Generate Information 
Monitor performance 
Seek accountability 
Seek Grievance 
Redress 
Formal bureaucracy 
Protests 
Political articulation 
Formal complaint channels 
Litigation 
Priorities 
Belief in efficacy of channel 
Sense of entitlements 
State Response 
 
 
Release Information 
Reform Processes 
Increase Resources 
Demands at higher 
levels 
Investigation/sanction
s 
 
 
Transparency 
Reduced corruption 
Behaviour change 
Formal and informal channels 
of reform demands 
Formal and informal channels 
of enquiry and punishment 
 
Legitimacy of grievance 
Capacity 
Public service motivations  
Reputational concerns 
Channels of influencing higher 
levels 
 
 
5. Tracing Causal Chains  
In the previous section, we examined each component of the black box more carefully to 
understand its nature and sub-parts. In this section, we focus on the relationships between the 
components - the pathways through which each component is expected to lead to the others. In 
order to do this, we start by tracing causal chains, assuming rational, self-interested individuals. 
Further work might expand such causal chains based on advances in behavioural economics and 
social psychology that elaborate more realistically on patterns of human behaviour.iv In the 
following we examine an illustrative and the most common causal chain for social accountability 
- the pathway from information to state response—although there are other equally valid 
pathways to accountability. 
 
There is a widespread expectation that providing information to the poor and disadvantaged will 
spur them into demanding better services. In fact several interventions have been premised on 
such an assumption (Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, Banerji, and Khemani, 2010; Pandey, et al. 
2009; Khemani 2008). Yet many studies suggest that information has little or no effect (Bruns, 
Filmer and Patrinos 2011). Similarly, social accountability is based on the belief that citizen 
action leads to positive outcomes (service delivery, governance, empowerment). Yet we know 
that citizen action leads to such outcomes only in some cases; in others it leads to frustration, and 
occasionally reprisal (Gaventa and Barrett 2010). Finally, state responses to citizen action are 
necessary for the desired outcomes, yet it is not clear why officials respond positively in some 
cases and not others. So what are the steps in the causal chain where the information to citizen 
action path might break down?  
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Lieberman, et al. (2012) present a fascinating exploration of why a large scale information 
campaign to disseminate the results of literacy/numeracy assessments and materials to help 
children’s learning and citizen participation in education in Tanzania had no impacts on citizen 
action. In their own initial work, a randomised control trial of the initiative found no treatment 
effect for the intervention (i.e. none of the observed citizen participation could be attributed to 
the intervention). To explore the reasons for this finding, they developed an analysis based on 
expanding the causal chain between information and citizen action (see annex 2). When simple 
survey and qualitative methods were used to test whether assumptions behind each link in the 
causal chain held true, they found that only, ‘a minority - sometimes a very small minority - of 
the subject population was reasonably likely to advance down any single step of the causal 
pathway towards increased citizen activism’ (Lieberman et al. 2012: 34/35). 
  
Extending this and other work on theories of change (Joshi 2013; Tembo 2012), we present 
below a series of steps that are required for information to lead to positive state responses. 
Following Lieberman, et. al. (2012) each step is posed as a question - for the relevant stakeholder 
in the process. When the answer to any of the questions is likely to be ‘no,’ then the process of 
translating information into citizen action faces a roadblock. When the answer is ‘yes’ then there 
is a greater chance of the desired outcome (in this case improved service delivery) being 
achieved. It goes without saying that these questions will have distinct answers in diverse cases. 
Although the causal chain is depicted here in a linear manner, there may be various leaps in steps 
and some looping in the chain in particular contexts.  
 
Figure 4.1: A Preliminary Causal Chain: From Information to State Response* 
 
Information Quality  
(Characteristics of the information type) 
 
Is the information new and unexpected? 
 
 
Is the information understandable? 
 
 
Does the information highlight gaps in performance?  
(As compared to standards, expectations or comparators) 
 
 
Is the information widely publicised? 
 
 
Is the information credible? 
(Who has provided information, is it legitimate due to processes of generation?) 
 
Citizen Action 
(Unpack motivations) 
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Did I receive the information? 
 
 
Do I understand the information? 
 
 
Is the situation worse than expected? 
 
 
Do I care? 
 
 
Can I do anything about it? 
 
 
Do I think my actions will have impact? 
 
 
If I need others will they join? 
 
 
 
 
Collective Strategy 
(Substantive characteristics of citizen demands) 
 
Who is likely to be responsive? 
 
 
What framing are they likely to listen to? (moral appeals, legal obligations, 
humanitarian grounds, political stability) 
 
 
Are there official channels where I/we could target my demands and complaints? 
 
 
Is going to the courts likely to have an effect? 
 
 
Do I/we have time and resources? 
 
 
Are there other actors I could take joint action with? 
 
 
State Response 
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(Substance of response types) 
 
Do I think citizens have legitimate grievances?   
 
 
Do I hold responsibility for the particular public good? 
 
 
Am I likely to be officially sanctioned due to citizen action? 
 
 
Do I care about my reputation?   
(If not, possibility of reprisal) 
 
 
Do I care about the service? 
 
 
Do I think I can do something about the situation? 
(if not, then could lead to helplessness) 
  
 
Do I have the capacity and resources to take action? 
(If not, then could lead to frustration) 
 
Do I need others to contribute in terms of resources/reforms? 
 
 
Can I motivate others?  Are others likely to collaborate? 
Do I have access to higher levels? 
(Depends upon whether resources, reformists are identifiable 
within the system) 
 
 
Reforms/increased resources 
 
 
 
IMPROVED SERVICES 
 
 
Potential Outcomes 
Empowered communities 
Increased trust between citizens and state actors 
Reduced corruption 
Institutionalised channels for interaction 
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Responsive public officials 
Increased legitimacy of the state 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted and expanded from Lieberman et al. (2012) 
 
 
The kind of analysis outlined above, that draws out causal pathways relating specific components 
of social accountability to each other can be useful in arraying the existing evidence on the 
impact of social accountability as well as in providing a potential checklist of micro-factors to 
consider before embarking on particular social accountability initiatives. The task ahead is to 
begin a mapping of mini-causal chains and mine existing studies (both qualitative and 
quantitative) to unearth the assumptions behind each step and the extent to which they seem to 
hold true more generally. Such work will also point to very simple pilot research for testing 
assumptions, that could be carried out prior to large scale implementation of initiatives, and 
prevent the likelihood of low impacts.   
 
One additional issue needs elaboration. Most studies of impact are looking for the immediate 
outcomes visible improvements in public services. Yet implicit expectations of long term 
outcomes are many. As one recent paper put it,  
 
‘expected results of social accountability include a reduction in corruption, better 
governance and policy design, enhanced voice, empowerment and citizenship of 
marginalized groups, responsiveness of service providers and policy makers to citizens 
demands and ultimately the achievement of rights, health and developmental outcomes,’ 
(Lodenstein et al 2013).   
 
These expectations range from immediate short term ones to more durable long term changes 
within states and societies. Expectations range from those focussed on social actors 
(empowerment, social cohesion, inclusive social norms), to those focussed on states (reduced 
corruption, responsive officials, better policy design, good governance) to those that improve the 
space where social groups interact with the state (institutionalised channels for participation, 
increased trust, legitimacy democratic deepening, better policy design) (see Joshi forthcoming). 
The task then, is to systematically identify all the potential impacts one might be interested in to 
trace the extent they might have been achieved in specific cases. 
 
An important part of the reason for doing this relates to our view of social accountability as ‘an 
ongoing and collective effort to hold public officials and service providers to account for the 
provision of public goods which are existing state obligations’ (Joshi and Houtzager 2008:3). If 
one views social accountability as part of longer political process of citizen-engagement with the 
state, then histories of prior engagement will shape expectations of stakeholders, expectations 
that will change over time. This relates closely to the definitions of relevant outcomes and our 
time frames of assessment: if a social accountability intervention fails in improving services but 
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scores highly on empowerment of citizens, do we consider it a failure or a success, given that the 
intervention has changed the long term prospects for accountability by changing the starting 
point for the next intervention? Whose definitions of outcomes count—they would be different 
for organic social accountability initiatives and donor interventions. Tracing a range of 
intermediate and ultimate outcomes is important for understanding the long causal chain of 
social accountability work, the impacts that might be achievable and the contextual factors that 
can influence ‘success’. 
 
6 Conclusions 
Current social accountability practice has been racing ahead of clear evidence of impact. The 
paucity of studies of impact (although increasing rapidly), the fragmentation of the data points, 
the lack of comparative evidence, and the acute shortage of mixed method studies, have all 
contributed to a situation where there is a strong normative belief in citizen-led accountability 
without a clear understanding of the conditions under which it can have impact. 
 
Fox (2014) offers a good conceptual start for doing this, by identifying in an inductive fashion, 
based on existing studies, several analytical distinctions, lessons from the evidence and new 
terms to guide further thinking and operational work. From his list, several general ones stand 
out. There is the overarching distinction between strategic approaches (enabling environments 
for collective action) and tactical approaches (localised, demand side, information based tools) 
and the observation that so far most accountability work has been located in the tactical domain. 
Another one is the appeal to move beyond the local, not just in strengthening state capacity, but 
also strengthening citizen capacity to make accountability work vertically up—beyond the local. 
Finally there is the need to not forget democratic electoral accountability and its links with social 
accountability, as ultimately, the goal is to make the political system work better. These ideas 
need to be taken up and internalised in operational work. 
 
Central to the debate is the issue of context. As we saw in this paper, there are particular 
challenges to any attempts to identify contextual factors. Foremost, ‘context’ is a loose term and 
can relate to any relevant condition. The critical task of course is how to identify which are the 
‘critical’ contextual factors. 
 
A two-pronged approach to the study of context seems to be emerging. On the macro side, and 
closely aligned to political economy analysis is an approach that examines the existing literature 
to identify patterns of enabling and constraining contextual factors in broad domains (O’Meally 
2013). On the other hand is an approach that attempts to unpack particular causal chains and the 
micro-contextual conditions that seem to make them work. As work on the former is relatively 
well developed, this paper attempted to develop the latter and start to flesh out some of the issues 
and challenges that lie ahead.  
 
The approach to context outlined here is distinct from attempting to understand the contextual 
conditions under which ‘labelled’ interventions such as community score cards or social audits 
work. Focussing on ‘labelled’ interventions is problematic because most often such interventions 
are not actually alike in their individual components: rather they share only a broad approach. 
Instead, by deconstructing the various mini-causal pathways (akin to strands in DNA) and 
understanding the contextual conditions that make them work, we could potentially recombine 
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the existing evidence to assess the promise of specific existing and new initiatives. In addition, 
existing initiatives could be assessed for the extent to which they travelled along the causal chain 
- and where the roadblocks to impact lay. Such an approach also ties in more closely with the 
more explicitly political and organic analysis suggested in the discussion of macro factors, and is 
rooted in specificities of the histories and norms of particular contexts.  
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Annex 1: Major Contextual Factors that Mediate the Effectiveness of Social Accountability 
Activities 
Six Contextual 
Domains 
Key domain sub dimensions 
Civil Society 
 
 Technical and organizational capacity
 Capacity to build alliances across society 
 Capacity to build alliances/networks with the state 
 Authority, legitimacy and credibility of CS
 Willingness of CS to challenge accountability status quo 
 Capacity and capability of citizens 
 Willingness of citizens 
Political Society 
 
 Willingness of political/elected elites to respond to/foster SAcc 
 Willingness of state bureaucrats to respond to/foster SAcc 
 State (and political elite) capacity 
 Democratization and the CS enabling environment 
 The nature of the rule of law 
 The capacity and willingness of political parties to support SAcc 
Inter-Elite Relations 
 
 Broad elite incentives to act in certain ways around SAcc claims 
 The extent to which the settlement is developmental 
 The extent to which the settlement is capable (organizationally 
and politically) 
 The extent to which the settlement is inclusive 
 Elite ideas and narratives of accountability underpinning the 
settlement 
State-Society Relations 
 
 The character and form of the ‘social contract’ 
 History of state-citizen bargaining (long and short-term) 
 State-society accountability and bridging mechanisms (formal and 
informal) 
Intra-Society Relations 
 
 Inequality
 Social Exclusion 
 Social Fragmentation 
Global Dimensions 
 Donor-state relations 
 International power-holder accountability 
 International political and economic processes and drivers 
 
Source: O’Meally 2013 
 
                                                 
i By ‘initiatives’ I mean both: organic citizen initiatives to demand accountability outside formal channels 
as well as external ‘interventions’ that aim to foster citizen demand for accountability.  I use the term 
‘intervention’ specifically when labelled initiatives such as community score cards etc. is meant. 
ii By micro-context, we mean the factors often identified in the macro strategy for their operation at the micro level. This is important 
because even if the overall climate in a country is favourable for SA type action, at the local level it might not be. For example, while 
a country might have a free and fair media, at the local level, the newspapers might be controlled by particular groups opposed to 
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greater accountability (see Schultze-Kraft and Morina in this issue of the Bulletin). Or particular groups/communities may not have 
access to newspapers, or radio, or TV, or might be illiterate. 
 
iii Credit for this point and the earlier point about comparative information, goes to Twaweza, whose thinking in this area was 
elaborated for me by Varja Lipovsek (personal communication, 2013). 
iv Even work based on such recent advances might be limiting.  Some ground-breaking experimental research in diverse populations 
about societal interactions and rational interest suggests our knowledge of human behaviour is based on studies of cultural ‘outlier’ 
populations—W.E.I.R.D. –Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich, Democratic (Henreich, et al., 2010).  Most of humanity might be 
operating on other cultural principles. 
